The Victorial Socialists in One Country by no means Excludes all Wars at Once. On the Contrary, it Implies them.
— Lenin. “The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution”
“German rulers placed special hopes on their Japanese ally. They very much wanted Japan to be the first to start military operations against the USSR… But the Japanese leaders avoided negotiations with Germany. Only in March 1941 did the Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka arrive in Berlin… Matsuoka refused to specify the timing of Japan’s attack against the USSR, which led to a sharp clash between him and Hitler.” (G.A. Deborin. World War II. Moscow. Voenizdat 1958. P. 108)
In those years, the Soviet Union did not allow foreign aircraft into its airspace. The shortest route between Berlin and Tokyo lay through Moscow, then along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok, and from there to Japan. Returning from Berlin, the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka made a brief stop in Moscow. And there, on April 13, 1941, a Treaty of Neutrality was signed between the Soviet Union and Japan. Both countries undertook obligations to “maintain peaceful and friendly relations and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability… in the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military actions by one or more third powers, the other Contracting Party shall observe neutrality throughout the conflict.” (Foreign Policy of the USSR. Collection of Documents. Volume IV p. 550)
The Treaty of Neutrality between the USSR and Japan was an outstanding achievement of Stalin’s diplomacy and a powerful blow to Hitler’s plans. Japan was an ally of Germany, but Japan refused to act against the Soviet Union; instead, Japan signed a treaty with the Soviet Union. The most interesting thing is that while in Berlin, Matsuoka did not tell Hitler about his intention to sign a treaty in Moscow in the coming days. On April 14, the day after the signing of the Soviet-Japanese treaty, Goebbels recorded in his diary that the conclusion of this treaty was a huge sensation. For Germany, it was a very unpleasant sensation. “The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact came as a great surprise to Germany. Ribbentrop instructed the German Ambassador in Tokyo to demand an explanation from the Japanese government.” (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Volume 1. P. 400)
The whole world witnessed the failure of Hitler’s diplomacy and the triumph of Stalin’s diplomacy. In Berlin—lengthy negotiations; in Moscow—a short stop. Lengthy negotiations are an unmistakable sign of disagreement. And in Moscow, an agreement was reached without long talks.
On April 13, 1941, immediately after signing the treaty between Japan and the USSR, Foreign Minister Matsuoka went to Moscow’s Yaroslavsky railway station; he was rushing to Tokyo. In accordance with the protocol, he was seen off by officials who were supposed to be present at such ceremonies. And suddenly, the protocol was violated. At the very last moment, a minute before departure, Stalin appeared on the platform. He never met or saw anyone off. Stalin was in an exceptionally good mood. Naturally, the departure was delayed. Stalin joked and laughed. He accompanied the Japanese minister right to the steps of the carriage, and there he committed an act highly uncharacteristic of him—he embraced the Japanese minister and declared that Japan and the Soviet Union would remain friends forever.
The German military attaché was among the entourage. Stalin noticed him, embraced him too, and stated something similar in content: Germany and the Soviet Union will remain friends. Such behavior from Stalin was completely unusual. He was always reserved. In the presence of outsiders, Stalin embraced no one. Many historians regard this highly uncharacteristic behavior of Stalin’s as a manifestation of a desire for peace, as an attempt to avoid war with Japan and Germany at any cost.
Exactly ten weeks later, on June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Soon Stalin found himself on the brink of ruin. At this critical moment, the Japanese government kept its word.
In the same year, 1941, Japan attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor; the war between Japan and the United States of America began. This was advantageous to Stalin, and contrary to the signed pact, he began secret preparations for an attack on Japan. “They knew Stalin poorly in Tokyo… After all, if the Japanese had at least superficially familiarized themselves with the life and creative path of the great continuer of Lenin’s work, they would have noticed that his method of action always remained the same: an alliance with someone against someone with a subsequent mandatory stab in the back of his, now unnecessary, ally.” (Ya. Galperin. The Third Front. Vesti. June 19, 1997)
For the time being, Stalin kept his intention a secret, but already in early 1943, he informed the American President of his determination to attack Japan. The cunning was that Stalin planned to launch a surprise attack on Japan not in 1943, when America was fighting a difficult war and needed help, but at the very last moment of the war, when Japan would be on the verge of collapse.
Communist propaganda asserts that in 1943, Stalin was fighting a mortal war against Germany, and all the resources of the Soviet Union were thrown into this war, so Stalin could not help America in any way. But this is not so. Stalin could help America. Stalin had the opportunity to sharply accelerate the defeat of Japan. The United States had a super-powerful strategic air force, but flying to Japan required crossing the largest ocean and then returning without refueling. Attacks on Japan could be carried out from the Pacific islands, but this required first liberating these islands, and that, in turn, required securing naval dominance. But even after the capture of the islands, flying still required traveling several thousand kilometers. The aircraft had to take a huge amount of fuel and an insignificant number of bombs. And the Soviet Union is right next to Japan. “US Secretary of State Hull tried to obtain permission from Moscow to use Soviet air bases in the Far East for the needs of American aviation.” (Ya. Galperin. The Third Front. Vesti. June 19, 1997) These requests were resolutely rejected by Stalin.
If Stalin had allowed the Americans to use Soviet airfields, each aircraft, instead of one long flight from distant islands, could have made several short-distance flights with a larger payload of bombs. The strikes of American aviation against Japan’s industrial facilities in this case could have been several times more effective. But this was not part of Stalin’s plans. It was profitable for him for the war between Japan and the United States to continue as long as possible. Stalin gave permission for American aviation to use Soviet airfields in the Poltava region for bombing Germany but did not give permission to use Soviet airfields in the Nakhodka and Petropavlovsk regions for bombing Japan. Stalin was waiting for Japan to be completely exhausted in a long war and was preparing his own blow.
As Japan weakened, Stalin intensified the psychological preparation of the Soviet people for war against it. On November 6, 1944, Stalin publicly called Japan an aggressor for the first time. On April 5, 1945, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. These were Stalin’s visible actions. And here is what was the invisible part of the iceberg at that time. In the summer of 1944, Stalin informed Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky that he would be the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the war against Japan. (VIZh 1975 №10. P. 60)
Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky is the most talented military leader in the entire history of the Soviet Union. He was unnoticed in peacetime, holding relatively minor positions. His talent unfolded during the war. When he was promoted to Major General in 1940, he was already 44 years old. “From May 1940 – Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff; worked on the operational part of the strategic deployment plan of the Soviet Armed Forces in the northern, north-western, and western directions.” (Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Vol. 2, p. 27). A month after the start of the German invasion, Stalin appointed Vasilevsky Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Now Vasilevsky was responsible not for a separate, albeit the most important, sector of the front, but for all war plans on all fronts and directions. Two months later, Stalin promoted Vasilevsky to Lieutenant General. Six months later—another promotion in rank—Vasilevsky became a Colonel General. A month later—a promotion in position: Stalin appointed Vasilevsky Chief of the General Staff, i.e., the highest brain center of the Red Army, and entrusted him with preparing the offensive operation in the Stalingrad area.
In October 1942, Colonel General Vasilevsky became Stalin’s Deputy. According to Vasilevsky’s plans in the Stalingrad area, all command posts and communication centers were moved close to the very front line. He also advanced airfields, hospitals, and huge reserves of shells, cartridges, and fuel and lubricants there. Until the very last moment, the Soviet troops knew nothing about what they were about to do. By keeping the preparation for the offensive a secret from his own troops, Vasilevsky also kept this secret from the enemy. And then followed a sudden, all-crushing blow…
During the rout of the encircled German grouping in the Stalingrad area, Vasilevsky received the rank of General of the Army. He held this rank for 29 days—after the completion of the Stalingrad Operation, Stalin promoted him to Marshal of the Soviet Union.
And so, in the summer of 1944, in the midst of the war with Germany, Stalin instructs Marshal Vasilevsky not only to plan a surprise attack on Japan but also to lead all Soviet troops in the war against Japan.
Vasilevsky was Stalin’s deputy in the war against Germany, but he knew the plans for the future: as soon as Germany was defeated, he had another war ahead of him.
Stalin had no intention of landing his troops on the Japanese islands. He had a more attractive goal. Korea, Manchuria, most of China, French Indochina (Vietnam) were captured by Japan. These were the territories Stalin intended to “liberate.”
From the summer of 1944, a gradual, invisible build-up of Soviet military power in the Far East began. Divisions, corps, and armies were being rearmed and reinforced, and all necessary supplies for a sudden crushing blow were being stockpiled. Roads, bridges, command posts, communication centers, and airfields were intensively built near the borders. Soviet commanders, according to orders from Moscow, advanced hospitals, warehouses, and depots for ammunition and fuel and lubricants right up to the borders. From early spring 1945, the transfer of regiments, brigades, and divisions from the Soviet-German front to the Far East began. “The main feature of the operation’s preparation was that all measures had to be carried out before the official declaration of war on Japan.” (Krasnaya Zvezda, March 16, 2000) Extraordinary camouflage measures were introduced. In the troops being transferred to the Far East, all sergeants and master sergeants had the shoulder boards of private soldiers on their shoulders. Junior officers had sergeant’s shoulder boards; senior officers had the shoulder boards of lieutenants and captains. Generals had far fewer stars on their shoulders than they had earned. A Major General might wear the shoulder boards of a lieutenant colonel or a major.
“It was forbidden to conduct correspondence and negotiations related to the transfer of troops; the maintenance stations for echelons and unloading were numbered; a number of echelons passed through junction stations without stopping, and their technical maintenance was carried out at intermediate stations.” (Colonel General V.N. Lobov. VIZh 1987, №3 p. 16)
“No one, not even staff officers, knew where and for what purpose the troops were being transferred.” (Krasnaya Zvezda. August 5, 1995)
The chief of the echelon was simply informed: you are proceeding to station No. 213. What this station was and where it was located, he could not know. Upon arrival at any station, the chief of the echelon asked the military commandant: what is your number? The commandant reported the number and gave the next instruction: your echelon should proceed further to station No. 710A, and so on.
On the way, soldiers and officers were forbidden to send letters. In addition to this, there was a secret order from Stalin across the entire Trans-Siberian Railway to collect letters from mailboxes but not to send them anywhere until a special order. If a soldier secretly dropped his letter into a box at a station, despite the prohibitions, it still could not go anywhere.
In May 1945, the troop transfer reached truly gigantic proportions. “The mass regrouping of troops began with the railway transport from East Prussia of the 5th Army, which had accumulated rich combat experience in breaking through fortified areas and operating in wooded terrain.” (TsAMO, fund 326, inventory 5047, file 701, sheets 1-99)
At the same time, the 39th Army was transferred from East Prussia, and the 53rd Army from Czechoslovakia. The 6th Guards Tank Army was supposed to play a decisive role in the defeat of the Japanese troops. It was transferred from the Prague area. In order to conceal the transfer of the tank army, the tank crew members had their shoulder boards changed, as well as the emblems on their shoulder boards; they temporarily became military medics, repairmen, and military builders. But the main thing is not that: the tanks and all the other heavy combat equipment of the 6th Guards Tank Army were left behind in Czechoslovakia. In Mongolia, in the area of the state border, where the tank army was being transferred, new tanks, which arrived directly from the Ural factories, were prepared and carefully concealed for it in advance. (TsAMO, fund 14-A, inventory 272, file 19, sheets 5-20)
In exactly the same way, the transfer of most artillery, aviation, and other formations and units took place. For example, in June and July 1945, 1,155 combat aircraft of the latest models were delivered from aviation factories to airfields in the Far East. (TsAMO. Fund 35 inventory 11287, file 1474 sheet 134) At this time, the flight and engineering personnel of some aviation regiments, divisions, and corps were transported by rail without material assets. New aircraft were already waiting for them in the Far East.
In addition, the 6th and 7th Bomber Aviation Corps and two military transport aviation divisions flew from airfields in Germany, Poland, and the western regions of the Soviet Union. (TsAMO. Fund 6 BAC, inventory 541971, file 1, sheets 1-4. Fund 7 BAC, inventory 555981, file 1, sheets 1-3)
The strategic regrouping of Soviet troops was carried out over a distance of 9,000–12,000 kilometers. The regrouping of troops on such a scale was carried out for the second time in human history. The first time—in May-June 1941, from the east to the German borders. In 1945—in the opposite direction. The commands of two fronts, three combined arms armies and one tank army, 15 commands of rifle, artillery, mechanized, and tank corps, 36 rifle, artillery, and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, 53 brigades, and more than a hundred separate regiments and battalions were transferred to the Far East. (VIZh 1985 № 8, p. 16)
In just three months, more than 500,000 soldiers and officers were transferred from Central Europe to the Far East. In order to reduce the volume of transportation, most of the regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and even an entire tank army were transferred without combat equipment. But even so, some formations had to be transferred with weapons and combat equipment; the amount of weapons transported along with the troops was enormous: 3,340 tanks and self-propelled guns, 7,500 cannons and howitzers, 3,600 mortars, 1,100 multiple rocket launchers, 1,400 combat aircraft. (The Victory of the USSR in the War with Militarist Japan. Moscow. Nauka. 1977. P. 47) The transportation of this mass of troops and weapons required 135,756 railway cars (VIZh 1985 38 p. 43).
During the surprise offensive operation, a monstrous number of troops that would be rapidly advancing needed to be supplied. Hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition, fuel and lubricants, food, and everything else necessary for the offensive had to be immediately supplied to the troops. The transfer of such a volume of cargo over hundreds of kilometers could only be ensured by rail transport. However, the Soviet Union had a wide gauge, while Manchuria and China had a narrow one. A decision was made to re-gauge the railway track to the wide Soviet standard. Special brigades of railway troops with the necessary equipment were prepared for this.
Arriving cargo was unloaded directly onto the ground in the area of border stations. Some of the cargo was not unloaded. It remained in the wagons, ready to cross the border behind the advancing troops. “By the beginning of the operation, more than 1,500 fuel tankers were standing idle on the Far Eastern railways… This created great tension in the work of the railways.” (VIZh 1985 38 p. 44).
After the completion of the strategic regrouping, the three Soviet fronts included eleven combined arms armies, three air defense armies, one tank army, and three air armies. In addition, the Pacific Fleet, the Amur Military Flotilla, NKVD troops, and the Mongolian armed forces were under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East.
“The grouping of Soviet troops numbered 1.7 million people, 30,000 guns and mortars, 5,250 tanks, more than 5,000 aircraft.” (Krasnaya Zvezda. September 1, 2000)
The Pacific Fleet had 427 warships, including 78 submarines and 1,549 combat aircraft. The Amur Flotilla had 169 warships and 70 aircraft. (VIZh 1975, №10, p. 66.)
Ahead of the troops, Colonel Generals Vasilev, Morozov, Maksimov, and Zolotov (in reality, Marshals of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, R.Ya. Malinovsky, K.A. Meretskov, and Army General M.V. Zakharov) arrived at the secret command posts. Stalin did not allow them to travel by train; to maintain secrecy, they flew by plane. In those days, this was a rather agonizing undertaking: 29 hours of pure flight time and 5-6 landings from Moscow to Vladivostok. But even this was not enough for Stalin; he demanded secrecy. Therefore, the “Colonel Generals” wore ordinary black coveralls without any insignia over their uniforms, and when traveling to the border, they wore the uniform of NKVD border troops privates.
Simultaneously with the transfer of Soviet troops from Central and Eastern Europe, a flow of cargo came from the United States of America. Stalin was the most cunning diplomat of the 20th century. He demanded food and fuel for the entire Soviet troop grouping from the US President. “An agreement was reached with the US on concentrating three months’ worth of food and fuel and lubricants for our troops in this theatre of operations.” (Krasnaya Zvezda September 26, 2000) In addition, aircraft, armored personnel carriers, automobiles, radio stations, telephone cables, medicines, optical instruments, and much more were supplied from the United States.
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